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Gender	Ideology:	For	a	‘Third	Sex’	Without	Reserve	Gerard	Loughlin,	Durham	University		
Abstract	‘Gender	ideology’	is	a	term	used	by	many,	but	especially	the	Vatican,	to	chastise	the	view	that	sexual	difference	is	more	than	just	male	and	female,	sexuality	more	than	desire	of	the	opposite.	Each	of	the	three	books	discussed	in	this	article	defends	some	version	of	this	supposed	ideology;	each	argues—though	in	different	ways—for	the	need	to	move	beyond	a	dimorphic	account	of	sexual	difference.	Their	arguments	are	taken	up	and	deployed	against	what	is	here	presented	as	the	ideology	of	sexual	dimorphism,	as	it	is	seen	in	the	body	theology	of	John	Paul	II.	It	is	argued	that	such	a	theology	dehumanises	intersexed	people,	along	with	homosexuals,	and	undermines	Christian	soteriology.	The	church	needs	to	acknowledge	as	fully	human	all	who	don’t	conform	to	heterosexual	dimorphism;	it	needs	to	embrace	a	‘third	sex’	without	reserve.		
Keywords	Gender	ideology,	hermaphrodites,	eunuchs,	intersex,	third	sex,	sexual	dimorphism,	John	Paul	II,	Michel	Foucault		
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Where	better	than	the	Catholic	Church	for	learning	how	to	be	queer?	Elizabeth	Stuart	has	said	that	she	first	learned	the	instabilities	of	gender	from	living	in	a	world	where	men	wore	frocks	and	women	the	names	of	male	saints.	‘Growing	up	surrounded	by	men	wearing	clothes	society	labelled	feminine	whom	I	had	to	relate	to	as	“father”,	taught	by	women	who	were	my	“sisters”	or	“mothers”	with	names	such	as	Augustine	and	Bernard	Joseph	taught	me	that	societal	categories	were	not	fixed,	that	they	could	be	played	around	with	and	that	the	Church	was	a	space	in	which	gender	shifted.’1	In	such	a	space	you	already	knew,	if	only	unconsciously,	about	the	difference	between	sex	and	gender,	the	biological	and	the	social,	and	the	fragility	of	their	connection.	Girls	could	have	boys’	names	and—though	this	is	less	common	in	English-speaking	countries	than	elsewhere—boys	could	have	girls’	names	(as	in	Marie-Dominique	Chenu).	At	the	same	time,	of	course,	the	Church	decried	any	departure	from	what	we	now	call	heteronormativity,	a	decrial	that	was	often	the	work	of	those	who	had	embraced,	with	varying	degrees	of	enthusiasm,	a	celibate	lifestyle,	those	who	had	become	‘eunuchs’	for	the	Kingdom	(Matthew	19:12).2	The	lack	of	fixity	between	gendered	names	and	sexed	bodies	is	an	example	of	gender	fluidity,	an	example	of	what	many	describe—deride—as	gender	ideology	or	theory.	Of	course	the	latter	is	more	than	an	observation,	though	it	certainly	starts	from	such,	or	includes	it.	Gender	theory	is	also	an	advocacy,	or	so	it	seems	to	those	who	decry	it,	those	who	think	it	a	distortion	of	what	they	see	as	immutable	givens.	One	might	think	the	naming	of	‘gender	ideology’	an	ecclesial	success	story,	since	Gillian	Kane,	writing	in	
The	Guardian,	traces	the	origin	of	the	term	to	the	Vatican	in	the	mid-1990s,	to	‘a	time	when	sexual	and	reproductive	rights	were	formally	recognized	by	the	UN,	and	when	gender	entered	the	lexicon	of	the	global	body.’	But	for	Kane,	gender	ideology	is	an	illegitimate	term,	a	‘catchall	phrase	to	sell	a	false	narrative	and	justify	discrimination	against	women	and	LGBT	people.’3	And	in	this	she	is	not	wrong.	If	the	Vatican,	in	the	
                                                        1		 Elizabeth	Stuart,	Gay	and	Lesbian	Theologies:	Repetitions	with	Critical	Difference	(Aldershot:	Ashgate,	2003),	p.109.	2		 See	further	Mark	D.	Jordan,	The	Silence	of	Sodom:	Homosexuality	in	Modern	
Catholicism	(Chicago:	The	University	of	Chicago	Press,	2000),	pp.198-205	(‘The	Excesses	of	Eunuchs’).	3		 Gillian	Kane,	‘“Gender	Ideology”:	Big,	Bogus	and	Coming	to	a	Fear	Campaign	Near	You’,	The	Guardian	(30	March	2018). 	See	further	Sally	Baden	and	Anne	Marie	Goetz,	‘Who	Needs	[Sex]	When	You	Can	Have	[Gender]?	Conflicting	Discourses	on	Gender	at	Beijing’,	Feminist	Review,	56	(1997),	pp.	3-25;	and	from	a	different	
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mid-1990s,	saw	the	deployment	of	‘gender’	at	the	UN	and	elsewhere	as	a	cover	for	homosexuality,	then	its	attack	on	‘gender	ideology’	was	an	expression	of	homophobia.4	I	begin	with	an	invocation	of	gender	fluidity	and	its	naming	as	ideology,	ironic	as	this	is,	because	the	three	books	reviewed	in	the	course	of	this	article	are	all	aimed,	with	differing	degrees	of	intentionality,	against	the	ideology	that	names	‘gender	ideology’;	against	the	ideology	we	might	follow	Gilbert	Herdt	in	calling	the	‘ideology	of	sexual	dimorphism’,5	but	which	is	also	complementarianism,	and	that	I	will	later	call	the	ideology	of	Genesis	1.27.	These	books	are	so	aimed	because	they	are	all	concerned	with	some	of	the	givens	that	Vatican	and	other	ideologues	must	overlook.	These	givens	are	what	I	am	calling	the	third	bodies	of	the	intersexed,	the	homosexual,	and	the	transgendered,	though	chiefly	I	shall	pay	attention	to	the	first	of	these:	the	intersexed,	those	once	named	as	hermaphrodite	or	androgyne.	These	are	very	obviously	the	concern	of	the	book	by	Megan	DeFranza	and	the	essays	edited	by	Susannah	Cornwall,	who	herself	has	written	at	length	on	the	intersexed.6	But,	as	we	shall	see,	it	is	also	an	interest	of	Adrian	Thatcher’s	work,	in	which	he	too	wants	to	lead	us	beyond	a	binary	view	of	the	body,	returning	us	to	an	earlier,	more	fluid	understanding	of	human	flesh.	None	of	these	books	are	exclusively	concerned	with	the	Catholic	Church.	DeFranza	pays	it	most	attention,	writing	for	Evangelicals	and	conservative	Catholics,	addressing	in	some	detail	the	body	theologies	of	Stanley	J.	Grenz	and	John	Paul	II.7	There	are	interesting	congruences	between	these	two	thinkers.	However,	I	shall	mainly	attend	to	the	Catholic	tradition,	to	that	Vatican	gender	ideology	which—as	both	
                                                                                                                                                 perspective,	Prudence	Allen,	‘Gender	Reality	vs	Gender	Ideology’,	Solidarity:	The	
Journal	of	Catholic	Social	Thought	and	Secular	Ethics,	4.1	(2014),	pp.	1-36	(esp.	pp.	19-23).	4		 See	further	Judith	Butler,	Undoing	Gender	(New	York:	Routledge,	2004),	174-203	(‘The	End	of	Sexual	Difference?’),	esp.	174-192	(p.182).	5		 Gilbert	Herdt,	‘Preface’	to	Third	Sex,	Third	Gender:	Beyond	Sexual	Dimorphism	in	
Culture	and	History,	edited	by	Gilbert	Herdt	(New	York:	Zone	Books,	1994),	11-20	(p.13).	6		 See	Susannah	Cornwall,	Sex	and	Uncertainty	in	the	Body	of	Christ:	Intersex	
Conditions	and	Christian	Theology	(London:	Equinox,	2010).	7		 DeFranza’s	concern	to	persuade	conservative	Christians	that	intersexed	people	need	to	be	taken	seriously	leads	her	to	play	down	the	issue	of	homosexuality,	which	is	mainly	mentioned	in	passing.	Intersexed	bodies	are	more	obdurate	than	same-sex	orientations.	DeFranza’s	orientation	to	the	conservative	may	also	explain	a	sometimes	apparent	naïveté	in	the	discussion	of	dominical	sayings,	as	if	they	were	verbatim	reports.	
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DeFranza	and	Thatcher	indicate—threatens	not	only	women	and	LGBTI	people,	but	some	of	the	Church’s	core	doctrines	about	Christ	and	salvation.8	Finally,	I	will	briefly	suggest—following	Adrian	Thatcher—how	we	might	think	to	undo	this	gender	ideology.	My	expositions	will	become	ever	briefer,	my	thinking	less	diaphanous,	toward	the	end	of	the	article,	but	in	all	I	want	to	impress	the	importance	of	these	books,	their	aid	in	helping	all	churches	move	beyond	present	gender	troubles.	My	argument	might	be	thought	of	as	inhabiting	theirs;	their	openness	to	the	‘third’	taken	up	and	redeployed,	hopefully	without	injury	to	their	thought	and	provoking	enough	for	readers	to	taste	and	see	for	themselves.			
Ideological	Bodies	In	2016	Pope	Francis,	in	his	exhortation	on	the	joy	of	love	(Amoris	Laetitia),	warned	of	the	challenge	posed	by	‘various	forms	of	an	ideology	of	gender	that	“denies	the	difference	and	reciprocity	in	nature	of	a	man	and	a	woman	and	envisages	a	society	without	sexual	differences,	thereby	eliminating	the	anthropological	basis	of	the	family”’.		“This	ideology	leads	to	educational	programmes	and	legislative	enactments	that	promote	a	personal	identity	and	emotional	intimacy	radically	separated	from	the	biological	difference	between	male	and	female.	Consequently,	human	identity	becomes	the	choice	of	the	individual,	one	which	can	also	change	over	time.”9		Francis	was	quoting	from	the	final	report	(Relatio	Finalis)	of	the	fourteenth	ordinary	general	assembly	of	the	synod	of	bishops,	the	synod	on	the	family	of	2015.	It	may	be	noted	that	the	pope	also	repeated	the	report’s	acknowledgement	of	the	difference	between	sex	and	gender,	but	with	its	caveat	that	they	can	be	distinguished	but	not	separated.	
                                                        8		 In	part	this	review	article	draws	on	a	paper	of	the	same	title	that	was	presented	to	the	10th	anniversary	conference	of	the	Centre	for	Catholic	Studies	at	Durham	University,	18-20	April	2018.	9		 Pope	Francis,	Amoris	Laetitia	(The	Joy	of	Love)	(2016),	¶56	(pp.44-45).	
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The	pope’s	reference	to	gender	ideology	is	as	clear	as	any	to	be	found	elsewhere	in	Vatican	teaching.	It	gestures	towards	unnamed	thinkers,	unnamed	texts,	to	discourses	that	assail	the	fixity	of	sexual	difference	while	promoting	a	fluidity	that	would	allow	people	to	think	and	rethink	their	gender	for	themselves.	It	echoes	earlier	pronouncements,	such	as	those	by	Joseph	Cardinal	Ratzinger	in	2004.	In	a	Letter	to	the	
Bishops	of	the	Catholic	Church	on	the	Collaboration	of	Men	and	Women	in	the	Church	and	
in	the	World,	the	cardinal	noted	that	in	the	perspective	of	gender	ideology	‘physical	difference,	termed	sex,	is	minimized,	while	the	purely	cultural	element,	termed	gender,	is	emphasized	to	the	maximum	and	held	to	be	primary.’		The	obscuring	of	the	difference	or	duality	of	the	sexes	has	enormous	consequences	on	a	variety	of	levels.	This	theory	of	the	human	person,	intended	to	promote	prospects	for	equality	of	women	through	liberation	from	biological	determinism,	has	in	reality	inspired	ideologies	which,	for	example,	call	into	question	the	family,	in	its	natural	two-parent	structure	of	mother	and	father,	and	make	homosexuality	and	heterosexuality	virtually	equivalent,	in	a	new	model	of	polymorphous	sexuality.10		Again,	no	actual	texts	are	named,	no	names	given.	The	accused	must	volunteer	themselves.	And	why	are	their	views	described	as	ideological?	That	too	is	undetermined,	but	for	the	most	part,	Vatican	documents	use	the	term	‘ideology’	as	a	slur.	It	marks	a	hostility	toward	the	teaching	of	the	Church	as	that	is	understood	within	the	Vatican.	It	also	works	rhetorically	to	obscure	the	fact	that	the	Vatican’s	position	is	itself	ideological:	it	is,	I	want	to	suggest,	a	teaching	which	pretends	to	a	universality	it	doesn’t	have,	and	this	obscures	its	particularity,	which	is	a	particularity	that	precisely	refuses	to	acknowledge	certain	facts,	certain	givens	that	it	must	ignore	in	order	to	misrepresent	the	world,	in	order	to	say	that	which	is	not.	And	it	is	precisely	the	refusal	of	reality	that	renders	it	ideological	and	permanently	unstable,	in	need	of	constant	
                                                        10		 Joseph	Cardinal	Ratzinger	and	Angelo	Amato,	Letter	to	the	Bishops	of	the	Catholic	
Church	on	the	Collaboration	of	Men	and	Women	in	the	Church	and	in	the	World	(31	May	2004),	¶1.2.	This	is	discussed	in	Adrian	Thatcher,	Redeeming	Gender	(Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press,	2016),	p.97.	
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repetition	against	the	real.	This	is	why	there	is	a	hermeneutic	of	continuity,	a	constant	policing	of	discourse	within	the	Vatican	‘ideosphere’—to	borrow	a	term	from	Roland	Barthes.11	And	so	I	move	to	my	chief	exhibit	of	Vatican	gender	ideology.	Unlike	his	own	theology	of	the	body,	the	‘theology	of	the	body	contained	in	Genesis	is’,	John	Paul	II	tells	us,	‘concise	and	sparing	with	words.’	Yet	it	merits	extensive	commentary	because	its	contents	are	in	some	sense	‘fundamental’,	‘primary’	and	‘definitive’.	‘All	human	beings	find	themselves	in	their	own	way	in	that	biblical	“knowledge.”’12	It	is	the	knowledge	of	the	difference	between	man	and	woman,	a	difference	which	is	captured	almost	entirely	in	the	woman’s	maternity.	‘The	difference’,	John	Paul	writes,	‘is	shown	only	in	a	limited	measure	on	the	outside,	in	the	build	and	form	of	her	body.	Motherhood	shows	this	constitution	from	within,	as	a	particular	power	of	the	feminine	organism’.13	Yet,	in	regard	to	Genesis,	we	might	think	John	Paul	an	unreliable	narrator.	John	Paul	II	repeatedly	introduces	a	reciprocity	into	Genesis	that	is	not	there.	Man,	we	are	told,	‘has	been	created	as	a	particular	value	before	God	…,	but	also	as	a	particular	value	for	man	himself;	first,	because	he	is	“man”;	second,	because	the	“woman”	is	for	the	man	and,	vice	versa,	the	“man”	for	the	woman.’14	But	in	Genesis,	Eve	is	made	for	Adam,	not	Adam	for	Eve,	as	St	Paul	knew	when	he	noted	that	‘man	was	not	made	from	woman,	but	woman	from	man.	Neither	was	man	created	for	the	sake	of	woman,	but	woman	for	the	sake	of	man’	(NRSV	I	Corinthians	11.9-10).	Eve	is	made	in	order	to	bear	Adam’s	children,	which	Paul	notes	when	he	goes	on	to	say	that	now	‘man	comes	through	woman’	(11.12),	and	which	John	Paul	recalls	when	he	remembers	that	no	matter	how	alike	or	mutual	man	and	woman	are,	they	are	also	almost	entirely	different,	though	this	again	is	contrary	to	Genesis.	John	Paul	tells	us	that	‘[w]oman’s	constitution	differs	from	that	of	man;	in	fact,	we	know	today	that	it	is	different	even	in	
                                                        11		 Roland	Barthes,	The	Neutral:	Lecture	Course	at	the	Collège	de	France	1977-1978,	edited	by	Thomas	Clerc,	translated	by	Rosalind	E.	Krauss	and	Denis	Hollier	(New	York:	Columbia	University,	2005	[2002]),	p.86.	12		 John	Paul	II,	Man	and	Woman	He	Created	Them:	A	Theology	of	the	Body,	translated	and	introduced	by	Michael	Waldstein	(Boston:	Pauline	Books	and	Media,	2006),	21.3	(p.211).	13		 John	Paul	II,	21.3	(p.211).	Pope	Francis	repeats	this	identification	of	‘woman’	with	‘mother’.	See	Thatcher,	p.172.	14		 John	Paul	II,	9.1	(pp.161-162).	In	support	of	reciprocity,	John	Paul	cites	Genesis	2.23,	the	verse	in	which	Adam	speaks	and	Eve	remains	silent.	
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the	deepest	bio-physiological	determinants.’15	But	of	course	this	is	precisely	what	we	don’t	know	today.	At	the	end	of	the	nineteenth	century,	Sir	Patrick	Geddes	(1854-1932)	could	argue	that	males	were	composed	of	catabolic	cells	that	paid	out	energy,	while	females	were	made	of	anabolic	cells,	which	conserved	energy.16	But	his	view	was	well	gone	by	the	end	of	the	twentieth	century,	and	now	we	are	told	by	modern	genetics	that	there	is	very	little	difference	between	people:	‘we	differ	by	only	sixty	out	of	thirty	thousand	genes’.17	It	is	time	to	introduce	the	third.			
Third	Bodies,	Third	Monsters	The	third,	in	John	Paul’s	theology	of	the	body	is	the	child,	that	in	which	‘the	man	and	the	woman	…	know	each	other	reciprocally’.18	But	this	third	is	but	a	repetition	of	the	two,	or	one	of	the	two,	as	male	or	female.	I	want	to	introduce	a	more	radical	third	that	calls	into	question	the	duality	at	the	heart	of	the	complementarian	ideology	espoused	in	papal,	Vatican	teaching.	This	is	the	non-spousal	‘third	sex’	that	is	neither	male	nor	female.	This	third	sex	is	here	and	at	first	a	conflation	of	two	different	kinds	of	contradiction,	both	of	which	Vatican	gender	ideology	must	either	ignore	or	deny,	and	which	it	denies	through	ignoring.	
                                                        15		 John	Paul	II,	21.3	(p.211).	This	echoes	the	teaching	of	Hans	Urs	von	Balthasar	in	
Theo-Drama:	Theological	Dramatic	Theory,	vol.2	The	Dramatis	Personae:	Man	in	
God,	translated	by	Graham	Harrison	(San	Francisco,	CA:	Ignatius	Press,	1990),	pp.365-366.	See	further	Gerard	Loughlin,	Alien	Sex:	The	Body	and	Desire	in	
Cinema	and	Theology	(Oxford:	Blackwell,	2004),	pp.153-154.	16		 Patrick	Geddes	and	J.	Arthur	Thompson,	The	Evolution	of	Sex	(London:	Walter	Scott,	1889),	p.266;	and	Patrick	Geddes	and	J.	Arthur	Thompson,	Sex	(London:	Williams	and	Norgate,	1914),	pp.77-80.	See	Thomas	Laqueur,	Making	Sex:	Body	
and	Gender	from	the	Greeks	to	Freud	(Cambridge,	Massachusetts:	Harvard	University	Press,	1990),	p.6.	Geddes,	of	course,	is	just	one	of	many	examples.	Darwin	before	him,	Freud	at	the	same	time,	and	Alfred	Kinsey	afterwards,	would	all	think	that	human	bodies	came	in	just	two	distinct	forms.	But	Geddes	roots	the	division	deep	in	biology.	17		 Joan	Roughgarden,	Evolution’s	Rainbow:	Diversity,	Gender	and	Sexuality	in	Nature	
and	People	(Berkeley	CA:	University	of	California	Press,	2004),	p.208.	Of	course,	versions	of	Geddes’	dimorphism	linger	on,	and	not	only	in	theology.	More	recent	versions	argue	for	a	fundamental	difference	between	male	and	female	brains.	See	further,	Thatcher,	pp.167-168,	drawing	on	Melissa	Hines,	Brain	Gender	(Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press,	2004).	18		 John	Paul	II,	21.4,	(p.211).	
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The	first	contradiction	is	the	body	that	though	male	or	female	is	not	spousal	in	John	Paul’s	sense,	not	ordered	to	heterosexual	bonding.	I	will	say	little	about	this	body,	except	when	noting	its	conflation	with	the	second	contradiction,	which	more	directly	disconfirms	papal	ideology.	This	second	‘third’	is	the	intersexed	body,	the	body	that	rebukes	John	Paul’s	insistence	that	human	being	is	created	either	male	or	female;	‘male	and	female	created	he	them’	(KJV	Genesis	1:27;	5:2).	Not	all	bodies—not	all	people—are	born	male	or	female.	A	significant	number	are	born	between	these	two	sexes,	except	that	their	arrival	calls	into	question	the	idea	of	a	singular	male	or	female	identity,	a	pure	masculinity	or	femininity.19	No	such	things	exist	apart	from	their	performance,	made	real	through	incessant	repetition.	Those	who	are	now	said	to	be	intersexed	were	once	known	by	other	names,	classically	as	hermaphrodites	or	androgynes,	and	biblically,	perhaps,	as	eunuchs.	‘Perhaps’	because	a	eunuch	is	commonly	understood	as	a	male	deprived	of	his	sex,	either	by	his	own	or	another’s	hand,	as	in	Jesus’s	reference	to	such	(Matthew	19:12).	But	Jesus	also	mentions	those	who	are	eunuchs	from	birth,	and	so	many—such	as	Megan	DeFranza	in	Sex	Difference	in	Christian	Theology20—take	this	as	referring	to	those	otherwise	named	as	hermaphrodites	in	ancient	literature.21	However	that	may	be,	
                                                        19		 John	Hare	offers	evidence	from	biology	in	support	of	this	claim,	in	‘Hermaphrodites,	Eunuchs,	and	Intersex	People:	The	Witness	of	Medical	Science	in	Biblical	Times	and	Today’,	in	Intersex,	Theology,	and	the	Bible,	pp.	79-96	(p.93).	20		 Sex	Difference,	pp.	70,	81-83,	102-106.		De	Franza	is	also	a	contributor	to	Cornwall’s	volume	under	review,	where	she	notes	that	the	biblical	character	of	the	‘barren	woman’	might	also	include	those	now	named	as	intersexed:	DeFranza,	‘Virtuous	Eunuchs:	Troubling	Conservative	and	Queer	Readings	of	Intersex	and	the	Bible’,	in	Intersex,	Theology,	and	the	Bible,	pp.	55-77	(p.58).	DeFranza’s	essay	here	is	preceded	by	another	that	discusses	the	eunuch	in	biblical	literature:	Joseph	A.	Marchal,	‘Who	Are	You	Calling	a	Eunuch?	Staging	Conversations	and	Connections	between	Feminist	and	Queer	Biblical	Studies	and	Intersex	Advocacy’,	pp.29-54.	21		 Susannah	Cornwall	in	her	own	contribution	(‘Laws	“Needefull	in	Later	to	Be	Abrogated”:	Intersex	and	the	Sources	of	Christian	Theology’,	147-171)	to	her	edited	volume	(Intersex,	Theology,	and	the	Bible)	is	quite	hesitant	about	identifying	biblical	eunuchs	with	the	intersexed,	carefully	arguing	that	absence	from	the	biblical	text	does	not	mean	absence	from	the	biblical	world	(pp.149-152),	while	noting	how	at	least	one	intersexed	Christian	recognised	himself	in	Jesus’	reference	to	those	who	are	eunuchs	from	birth	(p.148).	Cornwall’s	main	concern	is	to	argue	for	the	importance	of	‘experience’	as	a	fourth	source	(after	scripture,	tradition	and	reason)	for	Christian	theology,	and	draws	on	interviews	
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these	names	both	reveal	and	obscure.	They	reveal	that	there	were—that	there	have	always	been—third	sex	people,	but	the	nature	of	their	thirdness	or	intersexuality	is	hidden.22	We	cannot	read	back	onto	their	bodies	any	of	the	several	conditions	now	named	as	intersex,	whether	hypospadia,	various	forms	of	congenital	adrenal	hyperplasia,	varying	effects	of	androgen	insensitivity	syndrome,	chromosomal	variations,	and	what	today	is	considered	true	hermaphroditism	(or	hermaphrodism)	—the	presence	in	one	person	of	both	testicular	and	ovarian	tissues,	a	‘trait	that’s	rare	in	our	species	but	common	in	others.’23	Given	the	differences,	it	is	perhaps	misleading	to	think	of	the	intersexed	as	a	third	sex	between	two	others.	At	best,	the	idea	of	a	‘third	sex’	is	a	place	holder	for	the	complexity	of	human	embodiment.	‘To	a	greater	or	lesser	degree	we	are	all	intersex.’24	But	the	invocation	of	a	third	sex	was	often	a	way	of	referring	to	those	who	would	become	known	as	homosexuals,	those	who	were	thought	of	as	combining	both	sexes:	men	within	women’s	bodies,	women	within	men’s.	This	is	neatly	caught	in	Michel	Foucault’s	description	of	nineteenth-century	homosexuality	as	an	‘interior	androgyny,	a	hermaphrodism	of	the	soul.’25	We	may	trace	a	separating	of	these	two	kinds	of	third,	of	homosexuality	and	intersexuality,	but	if	doing	so	we	should	note	that,	early	if	not	later	on,	the	fear	of	one	was	the	detestation	of	the	other:	that	a	person	might	get	away	with	
                                                                                                                                                 with	a	number	of	intersexed	Christians.	Her	argument	is	typically	detailed	and	nuanced.	22		 Augustine	supposes	that	there	have	always	been	hermaphrodites,	androgyni.	See	
The	City	of	God	against	the	Pagans,	edited	and	translated	by	R.	W.	Dyson	(London:	Penguin,	1984),	Bk	XVI,	ch.8	(p.709).	23		 Roughgarden,	p.293.	See	further	DeFranza,	Sex	Difference	in	Christian	Theology,	pp.25-44.	24		 John	Hare,	‘Hermaphrodites,	Eunuchs,	and	Intersex	People,	p.	93.	The	invocation	of	a	‘third	sex’	is	not	meant	to	preclude	different	ways	of	counting;	of	thinking,	for	example,	of	five	sexes,	as	suggested	by	Anne	Fausto-Sterling	in	‘The	Five	Sexes:	Why	Male	and	Female	Are	Not	Enough’,	The	Sciences	(March/April	1993),	20-24.	The	‘code	of	“thirdness”’,	as	Gilbert	Herdt	puts	it,	is	heuristic,	‘emblematic	of	other	possible	combinations	that	transcend	dimorphism.’	See	Herdt,	‘Preface’,	pp.19-20.	25		 Michel	Foucault,	The	History	of	Sexuality	vol.1	An	Introduction,	translated	by	Robert	Hurley	(Harmondsworth:	Penguin	Books,	1984	[1976]),	p.43.	[Michel	Foucault,	Histoire	de	la	sexualité	I:	La	volunté	de	savoir	(Paris:	Gallimard,	1976),	p.59.]	
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homosexuality	under	cover	of	intersexuality—though	these	were	not	the	terms	or	concepts	employed.26	Foucault	details	how	in	17th	century	France	people	ceased	to	be	executed	simply	for	being	hermaphrodites	and	instead	were	offered	the	choice	of	becoming	one	or	other	sex,	of	living	as	either	a	man	or	a	woman.	Problems	arose,	however,	if,	having	chosen	one	sex	they	then	used	their	other	sex	to	enter	into	what	we	would	call	a	homosexual	relationship.	This	happened	with	one	hermaphrodite,	who	having	become	a	man	then	used	his	other	sex	with	another	man,	and	having	been	discovered	in	this	was	burned	alive.27	A	happier	case	from	1601	is	of	a	Maria	who,	having	become	Martin,	lived	with	a	woman,	but	on	being	found	to	have	no	manhood	about	him	was	sentenced	to	burning,	but	on	appeal,	while	still	judged	to	be	a	woman	was	ordered	to	live	as	such	chastely.28	Foucault	finds	this	significant	as	the	first	case	to	involve	a	proper	clinical	diagnosis,29	and	for	the	explicit	naming	of	the	hermaphrodite	as	monster.30	A	similar	story	comes	from	1765,	in	which	Anne	Grandjean,	who	on	finding	herself	attracted	to	girls	decided	to	live	as	a	boy,	moved	to	Lyon	and	married	Francoise	Lambert.	Being	exposed,	she	was	convicted	of	having	lived	with	a	woman	and	sentenced	to	the	pillory.	But	on	appeal	her	case	was	dismissed,	but	with	the	requirement	to	live	as	a	woman	without	entering	into	any	further	intimacies	with	women.	Foucault’s	interest	in	this	second	case	is	that,	at	the	end	of	the	eighteenth	century,	the	medical	testimony	rejects	the	idea	of	the	monstrous	hermaphrodite	as	a	mixture	of	two	sexes,	and	instead	
                                                        26		 One	can	discern	an	alike	fear—that	people	might	get	away	with	homosexuality	under	cover	of	thirdness—in	the	writing	of	someone	like	Oliver	O’Donovan,	but	with	the	cover	now	the	marriage	of	transsexuals.	See	Oliver	O’Donovan,	
Transsexualism	and	Christian	Marriage	(Bramcote:	Grove	Books,	1982).	This	early	piece	by	O’Donovan	offers	a	good	example	of	Protestant	dimorphic	fundamentalism.	27		 Michel	Foucault,	Abnormal:	Lectures	at	the	Collège	de	France	1974-1975,	edited	by	Valerio	Marchetti	and	Antonella	Salomoni,	translated	by	Graham	Burchell	(London:	Verso,	2003	[1999]),	p.67.	28		 Foucault,	Abnormal,	p.68.	29		 Foucault,	Abnormal,	p.69,	The	clinical	account	was	given	by	Jacques	Duval.	See	further	Joseph	Harris,	‘La	Force	du	Tact:	Representing	the	Taboo	Body	in	Jacques	Duval’s	Traité	des	hermaphrodits	(1612)’,	French	Studies	57.3	(2003),	311-322.	30		 Foucault,	Abnormal,	p.71.	However,	Augustine	already	found	the	hermaphrodite	monstrous,	though	entirely	willed	by	God.	See	The	City	of	God,	Bk	XVI,	ch.8	(pp.707,	709).	Roland	Barthes	picks	up	on	the	monstrosity	of	the	hermaphrodite	from	Foucault.	See	The	Neutral,	p.191.	
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proposes	that	there	are	only	those	with	defective	genitalia	that	render	them	infertile.	Now	there	are	‘only	eccentricities,	kinds	of	imperfection,	errors	of	nature.’31	And	this—Foucault	argues—allows	for	a	new	kind	of	monstrosity	to	emerge	in	the	nineteenth	century,	which	is	a	‘monstrosity	of	character’.	It	is	a	shift	from	the	‘juridico-natural	to	the	juridico-moral;	a	monstrosity	of	conduct	rather	than	the	monstrosity	of	nature.’32	It	is	the	monstrosity	of	homosexuality,	to	be	named	as	such	later	in	the	nineteenth	century.33	Foucault	finds	that	in	different	times	different	figures	have	been	found	monstrous.	First,	the	person	who	is	both	human	and	animal,	second	the	conjoined	twin,	who	is	both	one	and	two,	and	finally,	in	the	eighteenth	century,	the	hermaphrodite,	who	is	both	male	and	female.	In	all	these	cases	the	monstrosity	is	that	of	the	third,	the	one	who	crosses	the	divide	between	two	separate	domains,	something	that	is	contrary	to	nature,	and,	more	decisively,	contrary	to	conventional	and	legal	categories:	people	the	law	cannot	accommodate.34	These	cases,	or	at	least	Foucault’s	reading	of	them,	suggests	both	the	conjunction	of	hermaphrodite	and	homosexual	as	monstrous	thirds,	and	that	even	as	the	site	of	monstrosity	shifts	from	one	to	the	other,	from	the	hermaphrodism	of	the	body	to	that	of	the	soul,	there	remains	the	need	to	eliminate	such	thirds,	to	secure	the	realm	of	the	two,	the	simple	dualism	of	sex.	And	it	is	this	that	we	see	replayed	in	the	body	theology	of	John	Paul	II,	which	in	this	respect	is	very	much	a	theology	of	the	nineteenth	century.	A	third	‘third’,	to	which	I	am	paying	even	less	attention,	is	the	transgendered	person,	who	chooses	to	change	his	or	her	gender	to	either	the	opposite	of	that	given,	or	to	settle	between—as	‘they’	rather	than	‘he’	or	‘she’.	Yet	it	is	this	further	contradiction	that	gives	rise	to	one	of	several	ironies.	For	it	is	the	case	that	many	of	those	who	abhor	the	idea	of	changing	gender	are	yet	willing	to	have	the	intersexed	changed,	often	without	their	consent,	undertaken	when	they	are	too	young	to	know,	let	alone	resist,	what	is	being	done	to	their	bodies.	In	the	eighteenth	century	the	discovered	
                                                        31		 Foucault,	Abnormal,	p.72.	32		 Foucault,	Abnormal,	p.73.	33		 For	the	invention	of	homosexuality	see	Foucault,	The	History	of	Sexuality	vol.1,	36-49	(esp.	p.43);	and	Gerard	Loughlin,	‘Gay	Affections’	in	The	Oxford	Handbook	
of	Theology,	Sexuality,	and	Gender,	edited	by	Adrian	Thatcher	(Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press,	2015)	608-623	(pp.611-613).	34		 Foucault,	Abnormal,	p.66.	
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hermaphrodite	was	forced	to	choose	one	sex	or	the	other,	male	or	female,	and	did	so	by	adopting	the	clothing	and	possible	occupations	of	their	chosen	sex,	their	amorous	relationships	accordingly	limited	as	well.	A	similar	choice	was	forced	upon	people	in	the	twentieth	century,	and	still	in	the	twenty-first,	but	now	advances	in	medical	science	mean	that	it	is	not	only	their	clothing	that	can	be	changed,	but	their	bodies	also,	subject	to	surgical	interventions	that	will	conform	them	to	one	sex	or	the	other.	This	starts	in	childhood,	and	so	the	people	making	the	choice	are	most	often	the	parents	of	the	intersexed,	under	the	guidance	of	doctors,	and	not	the	intersexed	themselves.	The	most	notorious	case	of	this	kind	was	what	the	physician	John	Money,	of	John	Hopkins	University,	did	to	David	Reimer,	who,	as	a	young	boy,	suffered	severe	damage	to	his	penis	following	a	botched	operation	for	phimosis.	He	was	taken	under	Money’s	care	and	belief	in	the	social	construction	of	gender.	David	was	further	surgically	castrated,	a	vagina	created,	and	his	name	changed	from	David	to	Brenda.	Turned	into	a	girl	and	treated	as	a	girl,	s/he	would	be	a	girl.	Post-puberty,	Brenda	sought	to	become	David	again.	He	later	married,	but	then	separated	from	his	wife,	and	in	2004	took	his	own	life,	aged	38.	‘Life	for	him	was	always	a	wager	and	a	risk,	a	courageous	and	fragile	accomplishment.’35	Reimer	was	not	himself	intersexed,	but	Money	treated	him	as	if	he	were,	using	the	apparent	success	of	turning	David	into	Brenda	to	justify	the	reconstruction	of	any	number	of	intersexed	people	as	male	or	female,	and	at	an	early	age,	before	they	could	decide	for	themselves.36	The	pressure	to	conform	to	a	dimorphic	world	is	much	the	same	in	the	twentieth	and	twenty-first	centuries	as	in	the	eighteenth.	Everyone	is	made	to	fit	the	ideology	of	Genesis	1.27.	The	tolerance	of	some	for	such	interventions,	while	abjuring	transgender	operations,	is	perhaps	explained	by	the	fact	that	conforming	the	intersexed	to	male	or	female	is	forced	upon	them.	It	is	not	a	wilful	change	on	their	part,	and	so	not	the	monstrosity	of	self-direction,	the	refusal	of	instruction,	when	‘human	identity	becomes	
                                                        35		 Judith	Butler,	‘Doing	Justice	to	Someone’,	in	Undoing	Gender,	57-74	(p.74).	36		 See	further	DeFranza,	Sex	Difference	in	Christian	Theology,	pp.51-53.	Money	appears	as	Peter	Luce	in	Jeffrey	Eugenides’	novel,	Middlesex	(London:	Fourth	Estate,	2013	[2002]),	which	is	discussed	in	Nathan	Carlin,	‘A	Pastoral	Theological	Reading	of	Middlesex’,	in	Intersex,	Theology,	and	the	Bible,	pp.99-119;	and	in	regard	to	medical	interventions,	see	Stephen	Craig	Kerry,	‘Intersex	and	the	Role	of	Religion	on	the	Path	to	Health	and	Well	Being’,	in	Intersex,	Theology,	and	the	
Bible,	pp.121-144.	
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the	choice	of	the	individual,	one	which	can	also	change	over	time’,	the	horror	expressed	in	my	earlier	quotation	from	Pope	Francis.37	I	have	noted	how	John	Paul	II	discovers	a	mutuality	between	Adam	and	Eve	in	Genesis	that	is	not	there,	while	at	the	same	time	he	also	finds	a	vast	difference	between	man	and	woman,	which	again	is	not	present.	John	Paul	II	is	firmly	wedded	to	a	nineteenth-century	dualistic	understanding	of	the	human	body	that	is	almost	the	exact	opposite	of	that	which	is	in	Genesis.	Thus	we	must	distinguish	between	what	I	have	called	the	ideology	of	Genesis	1.27	and	Genesis	itself,	where	the	derivation—and	so	the	continuity—of	Eve	from	Adam	is	much	more	open	to	the	third	precisely	because	it	is	not	committed	to	the	two.	But	in	order	to	think	this	notion	of	the	body	as	a	continuum,	I	want	to	introduce	a	further	dualism,	which	is	that	between	what	Thomas	Laqueur	describes	as	the	one-sex	body	of	the	ancient	world	and	the	two-sex	body	of	modernity.			
Mixing	Sexes	Laqueur	proposes	that	sex	as	we	know	it	was	invented	at	some	point	in	the	eighteenth	century.	By	sex	he	means	the	distinction	between	man	and	woman	as	a	division	between	two	very	different	kinds	of	body,	suited	for	very	different	kinds	of	occupation.	We	have	already	encountered	this	division	between	male	and	female	in	John	Paul	II.	Laqueur	contrasts	this	modern	view	with	that	of	a	more	ancient	one,	which	thought	there	is	really	only	one	kind	of	body,	of	which	male	and	female	are	variants,	inversions	of	one	another.	Male	genitals	are	on	the	outside	and	female	on	the	inside,	but	otherwise	they	are	the	same,	with	both	producing	seed	which	when	mixed	produces	males	or	females	depending	on	the	relative	‘heat’	of	each,	on	the	temperature,	as	it	were,	of	the	mixture.	Laqueur’s	chief	exponent	of	the	latter	view	is	the	second-century	physician,	Galen,	whose	texts	remained	influential	throughout	the	medieval	period	and	into	the	early	modern.	Thatcher	considers	some	of	the	criticisms	that	have	been	made	of	Laqueur’s	work,	not	least	as	marshalled	by	Helen	King,38	but	judges—rightly	I	think—that	the	
                                                        37		 Amoris	Laetitia,	¶56	(p.45).	
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basic	thesis	stands	up.	The	one-sex	model	was	operative	in	much	ancient	thought—we	see	something	like	it	in	the	opening	chapters	of	Genesis—and	aspects	of	it	persist,	but	from	the	seventeenth	century	onwards,	a	little	earlier	than	Laqueur’s	initial	eighteenth	century	dating,	a	two-sex	model	gains	currency,	and	even	if	there	are	forerunners	of	such	an	idea,	it	gains	a	new	authority	from	a	newly	emerging,	empirically	based,	medical	science	that	by	the	nineteenth	century	has	usurped	any	previous	authorities,	not	least	the	theological.	Thatcher’s	interest	is	to	consider	the	current	gender	trouble	in	the	churches	once	it	is	acknowledged	that	much	earlier	Christian	thought	was	informed	by	the	one-sex	model,	a	formation	that	is	lost	to	view	when	a	modern	two-sex	model	is	projected	back	onto	earlier	texts	and	arguments.	Thus,	when	woman	was	but	an	inversion	of	man,	albeit	a	cooler,	weaker	version,	there	needed	to	be	no	worry	that	she	was	part	of	the	flesh	redeemed	through	the	incarnation,	little	question	that	the	hotter,	stronger,	more	perfect	version	of	the	human	should	represent	Christ	at	the	altar.	But	once	a	two-sex	model	predominates	these	conclusions	become	doubtful.	Is	woman	really	included	in	Christ	if	she	is	now	so	very	different	from	man?39	Vatican	teaching—according	to	Thatcher—posits	‘two	human	natures:	male	nature	and	female	nature,	which	are	absolutely	different.’40	It	follows	that	‘[i]ntersex,	third	sex,	and	transgender	people	are	officially	made	to	vanish.’41	They	are	not	fully	human.	But	also	vanishing,	later	if	not	yet,	are	women.42	For	when	there	are	two	
                                                                                                                                                 38		 See	Helen	King,	The	One-Sex	Body	on	Trial:	The	Classical	and	Early	Modern	
Evidence	(London:	Routledge,	2013).	39		 Angelo	Cardinal	Scola,	The	Nuptial	Mystery,	translated	by	Michelle	K.	Borras	(Grand	Rapids,	Michigan:	Eerdmans,	2005),	p.285.	40		 Thatcher,	p.98.	41		 Thatcher,	p.93.	42		 Of	course	one	ancient	solution	to	this	problem	was	to	think	that	women	would	become	men	in	the	life	to	come,	or	that	women	and	men	would	become	neuter,	angelic.	However,	the	tradition	resisted	this	idea,	insisting	on	the	preservation	of	sexual	difference,	however	transformed,	however	unnecessary	for	reproduction.	Patricia	Beattie	Jung	extends	the	preservation	of	sex	in	the	resurrection	to	include	the	intersexed,	though	in	a	slightly	ambiguous	way:	‘in	risen	life	we	will	be	transformed	into	people	of	the	apposite	…	sex,	that	is,	into	people	who	are	capable	of	being	reconciled	and	drawn	into	union	with	one	another	in	Christ.’	See	her	‘Intersex	on	Earth	as	It	is	in	Heaven’	in	Intersex,	Theology,	and	the	Bible,	173-195	(p.186).	
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natures,	male	and	female,	‘the	male	Christ	has	no	female	nature.’43	Female	nature	is	not	assumed	by	the	Word.	Thatcher	thinks	that	this	endangering	of	both	Christology	and	soteriology	derives	from	the	unrecognised	mixing	of	both	one-sex	and	two-sex	theories	of	human	being.	He	traces	it	in	both	ecclesial	documents	and	in	the	thought	of	influential	theologians,	such	as	Karl	Barth	and	the	inevitable	Hans	Urs	von	Balthasar,	whose	theology	Thatcher	judges	to	be	‘immoral’.44	We	might	wonder	if	Thatcher	has	not	overread	someone	like	John	Paul	II,	overread	the	distinction	between	male	and	female	as	two	natures.	But	indeed,	John	Paul	does	present	sexual	difference	as	an	ontological	difference,	and	in	doing	so	threatens	the	salvation	of	women.	A	similar	concern	is	expressed	by	Megan	DeFranza,	who	notes	that	John	Paul’s	enthusiasm	for	the	spousal	meaning—heterosexual	orientation—of	the	body	as	the	imago	Dei,	threatens	the	humanity	of	those	who	have	no	such	orientation.	She	is	thinking	of	the	intersexed,	those	‘without	a	clear	masculinity	or	femininity’	who	‘would	at	best	know	only	a	distorted	view	of	love	and	at	worst	be	placed	outside	the	possibility	of	love.’45	They	would	in	fact	be	placed	outside	the	human,	alongside	the	homosexuals.46	DeFranza	also	notes	the	problems	that	heterosexual	spousality	poses	for	non-vowed	celibates.47	Vowed	celibates—such	as	John	Paul	himself—are	deemed,	by	John	Paul,	to	be	within	the	spousal	matrix,	because	married	to	Christ,	though	this	might	put	male	vowed	celibates—such	as	John	Paul	himself—back	outside,	since	married	to	a	man,	even	if	only	phantasmally.			
                                                        43		 Thatcher,	p.98.	44		 Thatcher,	p.106.	Thatcher	has	been	reading	both	Corrine	Crammer	and	Tina	Beattie	on	Balthasar.	45		 DeFranza,	p.212.	46		 See	further,	Gerard	Loughlin,	‘Catholic	Homophobia’,	Theology	121.3	(2018),	188-196.	47		 DeFranza,	p.213.	
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Conclusion	The	Church,	of	course,	does	not	have	to	think	that	heterosexual	spousality	or	nuptiality	is	the	mark	of	the	imago	Dei.	This	is	a	recent,	modern	development.48	It	is	of	a	piece	with	the	modern	idea	of	sexual	difference	as	a	fundamental,	ontological	difference,	with	understanding	male	and	female	as	the	only	possibilities	for	being	human.	All	non-conforming	beings,	those	who	are	third	to	the	duality	of	the	two,	are	excised	from	the	realm	of	the	human,	unless	somehow	changed,	reconstructed,	made	to	fit.	And	again,	and	of	course,	the	Church	does	not	have	to	accept	this	understanding	of	sexual	difference.	It	is	not	there	in	Genesis.	In	Genesis,	Adam	and	Eve	are	one	flesh	(Genesis	2.23),	and	this,	of	course,	is	how	Adrian	Thatcher	proposes	to	redeem	gender,	to	find	it	but	secondary	to	the	kind—humankind—in	which	the	Word	became	incarnate;	the	Word	into	which	all	are	incorporated.	‘The	essence	of	humankind	is	Christ.’49	We	do	not	have	to	ontologise	masculinity	and	femininity,	male	and	female.	We	do	not	have	to	turn	them	into	idols.	We	can	think	beyond,	or	before,	sexual	difference.	We	can	remember	that	when	Adam	and	Eve	came	out	of	the	garden	they	discovered	a	world	already	full	of	people,	that	they	were	not	the	only	two	(Genesis	4).	They	discovered	the	third,	waiting	to	meet	them.	
                                                        48		 See	Fergus	Kerr,	Twentieth-Century	Catholic	Theologians:	From	Neoscholasticism	
to	Nuptial	Mysticism	(Oxford:	Blackwell,	2007),	pp.175-179,	199-201;	and	for	a	discussion	of	Kerr’s	argument	and	of	how	nuptial	mysticism	renders	the	homosexual	less	than	fully	human	see	Gerard	Loughlin,	‘Nuptial	Mysteries’,	in	
Faithful	Reading:	New	Essays	in	Theology	in	Honour	of	Fergus	Kerr	OP,	edited	by	Simon	Oliver,	Karen	Kilby	and	Thomas	O’Loughlin	(London:	T&T	Clark,	2012),	pp.173-220.	49		 Thatcher,	p.178.	‘The	whole	Christ	in	his/her	divine	being	is	beyond	distinctions	of	sex,	and	the	humanity	of	Christ,	as	tradition	east	and	west	insists,	is	inclusive	of	all	humans	whatsoever,	for	He	is	confessed	by	the	church	as	homo	not	vir,	
anthròpos	not	anèr’	(p.179).	
